Girona are down. The club that finished third in La Liga two seasons ago, that played the most exciting football in Spain, that qualified for the Champions League for the first time in their history, has been relegated. The final day of the 2025-26 season confirmed what had been building for months. A 17th-place finish for most of the campaign, a late surge that raised hopes, and then a defeat on the final day that sent them down by two points.
It is one of the most dramatic declines in recent La Liga history. Not since Deportivo La Coruna's fall from champions to the second division has a Spanish club experienced such a stark reversal of fortune in such a short time. The fairytale is over. The hard work of rebuilding starts now.
The Final Day
Girona went into the final round of fixtures on May 24, 2026, knowing that a win would likely secure survival. They were 17th on 39 points, level with Cadiz below them and two points clear of the drop zone. The mathematics were simple. Win, and stay up. Draw or lose, and rely on other results.
They could not get the job done. A 2-1 defeat, conceded in the 83rd minute from a set piece, summed up a season in which Girona repeatedly failed to see out games they should have won. Cadiz won their match. The two-point gap became zero. Goal difference, which had been steadily eroding throughout the season, sent Girona down.
The scenes at full time told the story. Players on the ground. Michel standing motionless on the touchline. Fans in the stands singing the club anthem through tears. It was raw and it was real and it was the culmination of a season that had been slowly slipping away since September.
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The Rise: 2023-24 Season
To understand the fall, you have to appreciate the rise. Girona's 2023-24 season was remarkable by any standard. They finished third in La Liga with 81 points, behind only Real Madrid and Barcelona. They scored 85 goals, the third-highest total in the division. They won 25 matches, drew 6, and lost only 7.
The football was breathtaking. Michel, the manager, deployed a fluid attacking system built on positional interchange, aggressive pressing, and devastating counter-attacks. Artem Dovbyk scored 24 league goals and won the Pichichi as the division's top scorer. Savinho was unplayable on the wing, combining pace and trickery with an end product that made him one of the most sought-after young players in Europe. Aleix Garcia ran the midfield with intelligence and composure that earned him a move to Bayer Leverkusen.
The results were astonishing. Girona beat Barcelona 4-2 at Montilivi. They put five past Sevilla. They went to the Santiago Bernabeu and nearly won. For large stretches of the season, they were the best team to watch in Spain, and the league table reflected that quality.
Third place meant Champions League football. For a club that had spent most of its existence in the lower divisions of Spanish football, it was an achievement that transcended sport. The city of Girona, with a population of around 100,000, was going to host the best teams in Europe.
The Champions League Hangover
The Champions League was both a reward and a curse. The financial windfall was significant, estimated at around 40 million euros for a club with annual revenues of roughly 70 million. But the sporting cost was enormous.
Girona's squad was not built for two competitions. Michel had essentially 16 or 17 players he trusted, and the step up in intensity between La Liga and the Champions League exposed that lack of depth. Thursday-Sunday scheduling in the early part of the season disrupted training cycles and recovery. Injuries to key players, which could be absorbed in a single-competition season, became catastrophic when there was no replacement of equivalent quality.
The Champions League campaign itself was respectable. Girona won two matches in the league phase, drew three, and lost three, finishing 22nd and missing the knockout rounds. They were not embarrassed. But the effort of competing at that level took a toll that manifested in their domestic form.
By November 2024, Girona were already in the bottom half of La Liga. By January, they were hovering above the relegation zone. The gap between their European adventures and their domestic survival was growing, not shrinking.
The Player Exodus
This is where the story turns from sporting misfortune to structural reality. The 2024 summer transfer window gutted the team that had finished third.
Artem Dovbyk, the Pichichi winner with 24 goals, left for Roma in a deal worth 38 million euros. Savinho, the electric winger, moved to Manchester City as part of the City Football Group network for 35 million euros. Aleix Garcia, the midfield conductor, joined Bayer Leverkusen for 20 million euros. Yan Couto, the attacking right-back on loan from Manchester City, was recalled and sold to Borussia Dortmund.
In total, Girona sold or lost more than 100 million euros worth of talent in one window. The replacements were cheaper, younger, and not at the same level. Some were loans from other City Football Group clubs, players who needed minutes but were not ready to be starters in La Liga.
This is the paradox of the City Football Group model. The investment and infrastructure that enabled Girona's rise also created a pipeline. When the bigger clubs in the network came calling, Girona's best players left. The group benefited. Girona, in the short term, did not.
Michel and the Tactical Dilemma
Throughout the decline, Michel kept trying to play the same way. The high press, the attacking shapes, the commitment to going toe-to-toe with every opponent. It was admirable and, ultimately, self-destructive.
The problem was simple. The players who made that system work were gone. Dovbyk's movement and finishing had created space for others. Savinho's dribbling had drawn defenders and opened passing lanes. Garcia's passing range had orchestrated the transitions. Without them, the same tactics produced weaker results against better opponents.
There were moments when Michel adjusted. In February and March 2026, he switched to a more conservative 5-3-2 for a run of six games, and Girona picked up 10 points from a possible 18. It was their best stretch of the season. But when the pressure intensified in April and May, Michel reverted to his attacking instincts, and the results followed a familiar pattern: play well, concede late, drop points.
The question of whether Michel should have compromised more aggressively is one that Girona fans will debate for years. The manager's commitment to his principles is what made the club special. It is also, arguably, what sent them down.
Key Numbers: Two Seasons Compared
The statistical decline between 2023-24 and 2025-26 is stark.
In 2023-24: 81 points, 85 goals scored, 46 conceded, 25 wins, 6 draws, 7 losses. Third place.
In 2025-26: 39 points, 38 goals scored, 62 conceded, 9 wins, 12 draws, 17 losses. 18th place.
The goals scored column tells the clearest story. A team that averaged 2.24 goals per game two seasons ago averaged exactly 1.0 this season. The defensive numbers worsened too, but it was the attacking collapse that defined the relegation. You cannot survive in La Liga with 38 goals in 38 games.
The expected goals numbers were only slightly better than the actual output, suggesting this was not a run of bad finishing luck. Girona simply did not create enough high-quality chances. The shot volume dropped from 15.2 per game to 11.8. The number of times they entered the penalty area with possession fell by nearly 30 percent. Without the players who could unlock defenses, the system ground to a halt.
City Football Group Questions
The relegation raises uncomfortable questions for the City Football Group. Girona was supposed to be the success story of their multi-club model: a small club nurtured into a competitive La Liga team through smart investment and shared resources. Instead, it has become a cautionary tale about what happens when the network's priorities clash with an individual club's needs.
The player sales that weakened Girona financially strengthened the broader CFG ecosystem. Savinho went to Manchester City. Other loanees returned to their parent clubs. The 100 million euros in sales revenue did not all stay in Girona. Some was reinvested in the squad, but the replacements were not at the same level, and the club's wage structure could not attract equivalent talent.
The relegation will test CFG's commitment. Do they continue to invest and try to bounce back immediately? Or do they redirect resources to other clubs in the network? The early signs are positive. Reports suggest that CFG plans to back Girona in the Segunda Division and that Michel will be given the opportunity to rebuild. But until the money actually arrives and the players are actually signed, the question will linger.
What Comes Next for Girona
The immediate priority is keeping Michel. The manager has become a symbol of the club's identity, and losing him would compound the relegation with a crisis of direction. Early indications are that he wants to stay, motivated by the desire to put things right and by a genuine connection with the city and the fans.
Squad rebuilding is the next challenge. Several players will leave, either because their loans expire or because relegation clauses allow them to move. The nucleus of Spanish players who came through the academy will likely remain, providing continuity and cost control. New signings will need to be targeted and pragmatic, a shift from the expansive approach of the past two seasons.
The Segunda Division is notoriously difficult to escape. Clubs with parachute payments and bigger budgets than Girona have spent years stuck in the second tier. Athletic Bilbao B, Real Sociedad B, and other B teams add depth to the competition. The travel is demanding, the pitches are inconsistent, and the margins between success and failure are razor-thin.
But Girona have infrastructure. The training ground has been upgraded. The academy is producing players. The stadium, while small, provides a genuine home advantage. If CFG invests wisely and Michel adapts his approach, a promotion push is realistic within two seasons.
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La Liga Relegation in Context
Girona are the first club to be relegated from La Liga within two seasons of finishing in the top four since Real Zaragoza in the late 2000s. Zaragoza finished fourth in 2005-06 and were relegated in 2007-08, a collapse driven by financial mismanagement rather than the player sales that undermined Girona.
The broader trend is concerning. La Liga's financial distribution model heavily favors Real Madrid and Barcelona, leaving mid-table clubs vulnerable to talent drain. When a smaller club overachieves, the bigger clubs respond by buying their best players. Girona are the most dramatic recent example, but they are not alone. Real Sociedad and Real Betis have both lost key players in recent windows and face similar structural challenges.
The league's new spending rules and salary caps, introduced to promote financial sustainability, have had the unintended consequence of making it harder for smaller clubs to retain their best players. Girona could not match the wages offered by Roma, Manchester City, or Bayer Leverkusen, and the result was a fire sale that left the squad too weak to compete.
Lessons for Mid-Table Clubs
There are lessons here for any club that finds itself punching above its weight. The first is that overachievement creates vulnerability. When a club finishes higher than its natural financial position, the market corrects by extracting the talent that made it possible.
The second is that squad depth matters more than squad quality when competing in multiple competitions. Girona's best eleven could compete with anyone in La Liga. But their next five players could not. The gap between starter and backup was too large, and the Champions League exposed that gap ruthlessly.
The third is that the manager's philosophy must be flexible enough to survive the loss of key personnel. Michel's system was perfectly calibrated for the players he had in 2023-24. When those players left, the system should have adapted. It did not, or not quickly enough.
Girona's story is not over. Clubs bounce back from relegation all the time. The infrastructure is there, the backing is there, and the manager appears willing to stay. But the fairytale, that magical season when a small Catalan club took on the giants of Spanish football and won, belongs to history now. What comes next will be harder, uglier, and less romantic. That is football. That is also life.
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